Rome excoriates publisher of a “credibly accused” list

In a shockingly frank judicial decision—decided in June 2025 but made available in English just last week in the canon law journal of St. Paul University in Ottawa¹—the Roman Rota, the rough equivalent of the Catholic Church’s Supreme Court in such matters, roundly condemned the practice of publishing lists of “credibly accused” clerics.

The case shows that the concept of an action for defamation under canon law is alive and well, along with claims for resultant damages. Whether and to what extent this development will cause American dioceses and religious orders to change course is not yet known. At present, the vast majority of dioceses in the United States have continued the illegal, immoral, and unprecedented practice of publishing lists of “credibly accused” clerics on the internet, despite repeated guidance from the Holy See that such a practice violates both natural law and canon law.

The facts of the case

While the names of the particular parties have been omitted from the published decision (a translation from the Latin original), the underlying facts of the case are straightforward. A man, identified only as “X” in the sentence, joined a religious order in 1980 and was eventually ordained a priest in 1993. Nine years later, he asked for and received a dispensation from the pope to leave the order and to return to the lay state. He eventually married and began a secular career.

Some thirteen years later, in 2015, his former religious order decided to publish his name on their internet site as someone against whom an accusation of sexual abuse from “the 1980s” had been “deemed credible.” The order also issued a press release declaring that the allegations that X had “abused” students had been “substantiated.” The man, protesting his innocence, repeatedly asked that the notice be taken down, pointing out the grave harms that had resulted. The order refused, and X subsequently lost both his job and his wife.

Electing to proceed under canon rather than civil law, X eventually brought an action against his religious order within the Church’s legal system. He pointed out that he was no longer under the jurisdiction of the religious order and that the decision to publish his name as a man merely accused of a heinous crime online inflicted immense and unjustifiable harm on his good name. Importantly, he also sought a repair for the damages that had resulted.

In a January 2025 deposition of the current superior general of the religious order—whom the Rota interrogated as part of the trial—the question was raised as to whether X had ever been tried by any court of law on the charge of sexual abuse. The answer was a simple “No.” Instead, the superior maintained that the allegations against X had been determined to have been “credible” and “substantiated” approximately three decades after their alleged occurrence by a for-profit private investigative firm hired by the religious order.

Strong stance by the Roma Rota

The concept of “precedent” does not function in canon law the same way that it does in the civil law systems of countries such as the United States. Nevertheless, this Rotal decision is far from irrelevant; indeed, the Rota is the judicial body within the Church that acts, according to church law,² “with the purpose of safeguarding rights within the Church; it fosters unity of jurisprudence and, by virtue of its decisions, provides assistance to lower tribunals.” It is therefore likely to have serious repercussions throughout the Catholic world, and particularly within the United States, or at least in those dioceses that still publish the names of men merely accused of conduct that has somehow been classified as “credible” or “substantiated,” outside of any process of law.

The Rotal decision presents arguments from Scripture, the 1983 Code of Canon Law, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, and even the civil law of New York and California in support of the judges’ conclusion that the religious order had proceeded in a way that was “radically illegitimate” (n. 50). The judges cite previous Rotal decisions on defamation, noting several instances in which it is legitimate (and perhaps even a duty) to reveal the alleged faults of another, such as when reporting a crime, giving testimony in good faith, or making a filing in connection with litigation.

But the Rota also cites the many recent reminders from Rome on the illegitimacy of the very act that led X to bring an action against his former religious order. Indeed, it is bewildering to see the practice of publishing such lists continue even after the Dicastery for Legislative Texts has issued—on two separate occasions,³ both of which are discussed at length in the Rota’s decision—strong condemnations of the practice of publishing lists of men merely accused. That Dicastery, the body entrusted by the Holy Father with the task of interpreting canon law, has held that such actions constitute a violation of a man’s natural human right to his good name as well as a blatant violation of his right to the presumption of innocence. The “supposed motives of transparency or of reparation” or of a broad but undefined “right to information” are not sufficient justifications, according to this guidance. In making such statements “our Own” (n. 44), the Rotal judges have elevated to a new and authoritative level what might have been labeled by some as merely the private responses to individual questioners.

The Rotal sentence also dismantles the distressingly common argument that merely repeating someone else’s accusation is not defamatory: It is “simply iniquitous to remove the protection of a human right when some person or persons have already violated that right” (n. 37). The judges point out that there is a significant difference between what is passed along by town gossips or extortioners and what is pronounced by those exercising authority in the Church. This is especially true on the world wide web, they say, comparing the internet to an ocean that contains all kinds of living and non-living things, including “immense volumes of filth and sordid material” (n. 54). By stating, on an official website, that accusations made by another have been “substantiated,” the religious superiors are essentially declaring that it has been “established (constare) that a certain person has committed crimes,” even though no trial has occurred. This is clearly illegitimate, according to the Rotal judges.

The decision states that a private investigation firm is not a “judging agency,” but rather an “inquiring agency,” hired (usually at considerable expense, it must be said) by the diocese or religious order to investigate claims. These agencies are “not a court of law,” but merely present the results of their inquiries to the decision makers within the religious entity (n. 49). It is manifestly clear that all this is done outside of a trial, which means there is no opportunity for the one accused to exercise fully his natural right to defense.

The judges refer to infamous instances of false accusations (particularly the Carl Beech prosecution in England), and compare the religious order’s attempt to justify its conduct—i.e., stating that “the private good [of X] must yield to the ‘common good’ and to the ‘salvation of souls’”—to Caiaphas’ statement it was better that one man should die rather than the whole nation should perish (cf. John 11:50). In refreshingly clear prose, the judges point out that such an argument betrays a “flawed conception of the ‘common good’” as well as a corrupted use of the supreme law of the Church, as if the “salvation of souls” could serve as “some instrument by which the rule of law in the Church could at any time be undermined” to the detriment of an individual (n. 57).

The Rotal sentence also counters the argument—commonly offered by apologists of list publishing—that such practices are necessary to remedy years of past negligence in protecting children: “Reparation for evil deeds cannot be had by doing evil to others . . . past injustice towards little ones cannot be repaired by committing injustice towards adults, the elderly, the deceased,” all of whom have never been convicted of a delict nor accused before a judge of either the civil or canonical forum and yet declared to be child sex abusers in front of the entire world.

Neither does the risk of “scandal” justify jettisoning firmly established juridical goods such as the rights to reputation, due process, and the presumption of innocence. Citing Thomas More’s famous line from Robert Bolt’s play A Man for All Seasons about giving even the devil the benefit of the rule of law, the judges note that “scandal is never a reason to abandon the rule of law” (n. 66).

The judges also refer to the widespread fear among a given diocese’s presbyterate in which lists of “credibly accused” priests serve. The clerics “live terrified, fearing lest the Ordinary, without any prior penal process, not even an administrative one, should proclaim them . . . before the people of God, indeed before the whole world, using one formula or another, as abusers of children, with every recourse removed” (n. 63; emphasis in original). This keen observation is, sadly, supported by recent surveys of priestly morale.⁴

Important legal conclusion

One of the most significant and far-reaching legal conclusions articulated in the Rota’s decision relates to the nature of an internet posting and its attendant liability. Modern courts have had to grapple with technological developments, including whether an announcement made on a website is legally different from one in a book or printed magazine. This is especially important when it comes to statutes of limitation; i.e., determining how soon after an injurious act a plaintiff needs to bring a claim.

In this case, the Rota adopts what could be termed a “continuing-publication” rule rather than a “single-publication” rule, meaning that each and every moment the defamatory statement about X was available on the religious order’s website, the harmful act was “placed anew” (n. 38). The judges point out that the gravity of the harm done by means of the internet is “infinitely” greater than by other means, “since this publication is made to the whole world at once, namely to all human beings dwelling everywhere in all regions of the world.” Their conclusion about liability is stark, and ought to send shivers up the spines of every lawyer for every entity currently publishing “credibly accused” lists: “The perpetrator’s obligation to respond (in English: ‘liability’) is proportionately greater when he has it in his power to cease from the publication but rather chooses to persist (even though warned) in the act of publication” (n. 38).

In addition to the important considerations mentioned above, the decision is remarkable for its sharp criticisms of both the religious order’s conduct and the arguments made on its behalf by its canonical counsel. In response to the “rhetorical excesses” in the brief filed on behalf of the order, the Rotal judges at one point compare the arguments to those in Alice in Wonderland (n. 59). They also state their incredulity that “any reasonable person” could believe “that there is nothing illegitimate in a powerful institution announcing to the whole world that a determined private person has committed a grave delict of which that person has never been convicted nor even accused in a trial” (n. 56).

At one point in the decision, the apparent exasperation of the judges is particularly evident. A civil lawyer attempting to justify the publication of lists had argued in a brief filed with the court that the term “credibly accused” did not mean that the allegation had been “substantiated or proven.” With a bitterness not diminished by the Latin, the Rotal judges observed that the “astute” local bishop, who “in order to diminish his own liability for the injury to the good reputation” of the men named on the list,” somehow nevertheless “explicitly declares that to have been ‘credibly accused’ does not mean that his diocese considers the allegation to have been ‘substantiated’”—a position directly opposite to the one made to the “whole human race” on the internet. The judges then ask, pointedly, “Quidni et circulum quadratum facias,” that is, “Why not square the circle while you are at it?” (n. 61).

The decision was only an “interlocutory” sentence, meaning that the trial is not yet over. The issue of whether there had indeed been an unjustifiable harm done to X’s good name had to be decided before proceeding to the next part of the trial, namely, the determination of damages. So there might be more to come on this case, which will almost certainly garner international attention. Beyond that, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent judges from other tribunals will rely upon the reasoning in this decision in other controversies. It is entirely possible that hundreds of priests whose names have been included on these lists will ask the Rota to assess the facts and weigh whether damages might be sought in their individual cases.

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