The main point of just war doctrine is to guide public authorities in determining whether a military action they are considering is morally defensible. In a democratic society, it also assists citizens in carrying out their own duties as voters, opinion makers, and so on.
But what of the servicemen who have to fight in the wars their governments decide to wage? Do they have an obligation to make a moral judgment about these wars in light of just war criteria? Must they refuse to fight in an unjust war?
Naturally, the just war tradition has addressed these questions. What follows is an explanation of the basic principles. The first thing to say is that the tradition draws a distinction between two main sets of questions: jus ad bellum questions, which have to do with the conditions under which a war may justly be entered into; and jus in bello questions, which have to do with how a war is to be conducted once it has started.
Where the first set of questions is concerned, the tradition holds that public authorities are to be held to a stricter standard of certainty about the justice of a war than soldiers are. They are, after all, the ones with the authority to go to war, and thus the ones with the primary responsibility to come to a sound judgment about the matter.
The prevailing view in the tradition is that public authorities have to be morally certain of the justice of a war before initiating it. This is a degree of certainty lower than metaphysical certainty but higher than mere probability. Suppose a hunter considers firing into some bushes. Naturally, it would be immoral to do so if he weren’t certain that another person was not standing behind the bushes. That doesn’t mean that he has to have the degree of certainty attaching to mathematical propositions like 1 + 1 = 2. But he has to have a degree of confidence stronger than a bare likelihood that no one is there. He would be guilty of recklessness otherwise.
Since war is, of course, even more dangerous than firing a gun into bushes, governments need to have a similar degree of certainty that a proposed war meets all the criteria of just war doctrine (just cause, reasonable hope for success, lawful authority, and so on).
Soldiers, however, are not ordinarily obligated to make such a determination. For one thing, most of them would not have expert knowledge of the details of just war doctrine. For another, usually they would not be privy to all the relevant concrete facts to which just war doctrine must be applied when deciding upon the justice of some proposed war. Furthermore, they have a general obligation to obey their superiors, and without a strong presumption that they will in fact obey, no military organization would be workable.
Hence, soldiers can and should presume that a war they are sent to fight is just, even if they have doubts. Moreover, even if it is unjust, once a war starts, their country and fellow soldiers are in danger, and it is legitimate to defend them. (Here’s an analogy. Suppose your father foolishly and unjustly picks a fight with another man, who proceeds to start beating him up. You can and should defend your father from this harm, even though he is in the wrong.)
To be sure, the presumption that a war is just can be overridden. As the Scholastic just war theorist Francisco de Vitoria writes, “if the war seems patently unjust to the subject, he must not fight, even if he is ordered to do so by the prince” (On the Law of War, Question 2, Article 2). But what would make a war “patently” unjust? Here, I would argue that the standard has to be a high one. Again, a military organization would simply be unworkable if soldiers could opt out of any war they personally judged to be unjust.
When addressing the issue of what degree of certitude public authorities and soldiers must possess, another Scholastic, Francisco Suárez, emphasizes the just cause condition of just war doctrine (The Three Theological Virtues: On Charity, Disputation 13, On War, Section VI). This seems to me correct. A soldier is not in the best position to make a certain judgment about whether a war meets criteria such as likelihood of success, or right intention on the part of public authorities. But the justice of a cause can, in some cases, be easier to judge.
Consider two concrete examples: driving Iraq out of Kuwait in the 1990-91 Gulf War and taking Greenland by military force, which President Trump at first declined to rule out. I would say that the first was plausibly a just cause for war, whereas the second was manifestly unjust. Of course, some would dispute the overall wisdom or even justice of the Gulf War, but the narrow aim of helping our ally Kuwait to drive the Iraqis out of its unjustly conquered territory, considered by itself, was certainly legitimate.
Hence, a U.S. soldier could and should have obeyed his superiors in that conflict, even if he personally had doubts about it. By contrast, seizing our ally Denmark’s territory by force simply because Trump thinks the U.S. needs it would straightforwardly amount to theft, and any killing that would have been done in the process would have been murder. Hence, had the U.S. actually decided to carry out such an attack, soldiers could legitimately have disobeyed their orders. This was the judgment of Timothy Broglio, the Archbishop for U.S. Military Services, and I think he was right.
However, except in clear cases like this, where the cause for which a war is fought is patently immoral, soldiers can act on the presumption that a war is just. If that presumption turns out to be mistaken, the moral guilt for the unjust war attaches to the public authorities who initiated it, not the soldiers who fight in it.
All of this has to do with jus ad bellum questions. Jus in bello questions are more straightforward. Even when jus ad bellum conditions are all clearly met so that a war is manifestly just, by no means is an “anything goes” approach legitimate in fighting it. Regardless of the justice of the cause, certain methods of warfare are intrinsically gravely evil and may never be resorted to. For example, it is murder deliberately to target civilians, or to kill enemy soldiers who have already been rendered harmless by being wounded or taken prisoner. Hence, orders to carry out such actions must be disobeyed. Indeed, the U.S.’s own Uniform Code of Military Justice requires servicemen to disobey such manifestly unlawful orders.
In short, the general principles that just war doctrine provides for guiding soldiers are: First, in determining whether to participate in a war decided upon by their government, soldiers should presume that the war is just and thus participate, unless the end for which the war is being fought is manifestly immoral. Second, in the conduct of the war, once it begins, soldiers should never obey specific orders to do something that is manifestly immoral.
(Editor’s note: This essay was first published, in slightly different form, on the author’s website and appears here with kind permission.)
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We have a moral obligation to defend our own lives and the lives of those who are defenseless from the evil of Islam and its prime agent of global terrorism – Iran. It’s been Iran who has shouted “Death to America” for almost 50 years and who has committed violent acts of agression against Western society which Islam intends to destroy. The last straw was Islamic Iran building nuclear weapons. Let’s not be stupid in our suicidal mission to be “just.” Justice does not require us to eschew self defense.
One can only wonder if the 2nd Coming of Jesus Christ will be considered an application of Just War Theory to abolish evil and restore His Good Creation.
The idea of using military force to take Greenland makes no sense. We already have bases in Greenland, we already have troops there on the ground. If the US wants an increased military presence there,we could negotiate it with Denmark.
The bluff, bluster and bullying accomplished nothing except make us look foolish. It did not deter China or Russia.
I don’t believe we had the intention of taking Greenland by force. Pres. Trump is a dealmaker & sometimes it’s difficult to understand his maneuvers or what cards he’s holding. Which may be a part in why he’s so successful at it.
My grandma was a cardplayer & that’s been a strategy in winning, whether it’s cards or global affairs. You don’t just lay everything out on the table.
Insults and threats to old allies is not clever deal making, it is asinine to threaten friends and indicative of a character flaw. His foreign policy and tariffs are a disaster. We are in a war and the economy is in the toilet. You think this is wise?
Dr. Feser is academically correct about jus in bello decisions on the battlefield. But we must read the heart as well as the head. Imagine an 18-year-old boy, just out of Army basic training or Marine boot camp, having had it drilled (necessarily, by the way) into his head that he must obey orders (there will be a training tip of the hat to the adjective LEGAL–which that 18-year-old will hardly fully comprehend), now finding himself in combat, bullets whizzing by, buddies being wounded or killed, and expected to analyze the justice or legality of orders received from, say, a commissioned officer. This works well in the library; it does not work so well under fire. I won’t belabor the point, but consider it well. Having taught military ethics for twenty years in a war college, I think I “get” this point. Having appealed for that consideration, permit me, fleetingly, to state the “other” side. Army Captain Aubrey Daniel, the prosecutor in the Calley case, replying to the proffered defense of Calley’s obedience and ignorance, remarked that a man of “ordinary sense and understanding” would have known that the orders for massacre (if in fact they were originally issued) were wrong (evil, heinous, flagitious)–of course. At its heart, Daniel’s point is a natural law argument (see CCC #1954), and it’s foundationally critical to any jurisprudential system–and to every soldier! Army Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson knew that. (If you do not know his story, please look it up.) To be brief: We must hold soldiers responsible for perpetrating crimes, on or off the battlefield; but we must also be very aware of legitimate extenuating or mitigating circumstances. That is the chief reason, by the way, that soldiers accused of crimes on the battlefield ordinarily want other seasoned soldiers, also combat veterans, to sit on their juries. I don’t challenge Professor Feser’s logic. I appeal. though, to his readers for–when it’s appropriate [“hard cases make bad law”]–compassion. That 18-year-old private carries a terribly heavy load–and I’m not speaking (only) of his rucksack. As a former (non-combat) Army officer AND as a deacon, I appeal to John 7:24, a quadrigal reading of which helps, I think, to make the case for both justice and mercy (insofar as we poor humans are able, in our stumbling ways, to blend them in our moral judgments and legal decisions).
Yours truly is reassured…in 1967 I actually dipped into Suarez, to finally put my mind to rest on the urgent question. Only decades later to read in the tell-all memoires of the Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, that he was too intimidated to inform the volcanic President Johnson that the War was not winnable (“In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam,” 1995). Things ground along for another seven years…Of his behavior he wrote (“it was wrong, very wrong.”)
So, details in back rooms matter. But what we need is a broader perspective on real “war” or only “military intervention” or whatever. The much-misrepresented Carl von Clausewitz provides such a tract, based on his close-up observations of the not-quite-modern Napoleonic wars (On War, 1832). What does he mean by “war is the continuation of politics by other means?”
Not that war is the alternative to politics, but that when politics fails, then warfare becomes another limited tool (Clausewitz’s premise) in the larger toolbox of politics, history, culture, and problematic human nature—to render the enemy “powerless”. In a long and dense reader’s guide we read, for example, “Distress at the brutality of war must not be allowed to inhibit the use of means ‘for war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst’,” (Bernard Brodie, included in Howard and Paret, eds., “On War,” Everyman’s Library, 1976/1993).
Clausewitz is dated in his distinction between strategy and tactics, nor foreseeing how these become inverted by the invention of the machine gun in World War I, or the replacement of battleship warfare by the aircraft carrier in World War II, or today possibly by the replacement of carpet bombing by precision missiles (with restricted collateral damage).
QUESTION: Without contesting the application of more-or-less precise just war doctrine, how today do we also consider the wider mix, including prolonged negotiation, proxy terrorism, specter of likely/unlikely (?) nuclear blackmail, the recently the reported street-slaughter of maybe 30,000 Iranian citizens/subjects (?), AND, the centuries-long history of jihad with its own doctrine that by its very nature jihad IS just war?
(Clausewitz’s “powerless” could have been limited to destruction of nuclear facilities, missile capabilities, and probably the navy. In my amateur armchair opinion. Especially given the universal Law of Unintended Consequences.)
The night before he was murdered while celebrating Mass, Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador said on the radio: “I would like to appeal in a special way to the men of the army, and in particular to the troops of the National Guard, the police, and the garrisons. Brothers, you belong to our own people. You kill your own brother peasants; and in the face of an order to kill that is given by a man, the law of God that says ‘Do not kill!’ should prevail.
“No soldier is obliged to obey an order counter to the law of God. No one has to comply with an immoral law. It is the time now that you recover your conscience and obey its dictates rather than the command of sin. . . . Therefore, in the name of God, and in the name of this long-suffering people, whose laments rise to heaven every day more tumultuous, I beseech you, I beg you, I command you! In the name of God: ‘Cease the repression!’”
There seems to be a contradiction. You say soldiers have the obligation to assume a war is just if their superiors have done so and there’s no manifest reason not to. Fair enough, but then you assume a US war for Greenland is patently unjust. But what makes your conditions for knowing enough to make such a declaration, different from a soldier’s conditions for the same type of knowledge? The soldier can’t disobey orders despite doubts, but Mr. Feser can effectively counsel such soldiers to disobey prospective orders because…why?
Are you sure you know enough about what was and wasn’t happening in Greenland to make such a pronouncement? Do you know what the Chinese or Russians were up to? What Denmark was or wasn’t doing in response? Surely you don’t assume we average citizens have the means to know such things, so aren’t you violating your own advice here?
Another bit of sloppiness: if my father unwisely picks a fight and starts to get beat up, you say I should defend him, but what does “defend” mean? Fight the other man to the death? Simply put my body in the way and take blows until my own death? Something in between? What if my father, once relieved of the blows, continues to fight back, incurring more wrath from the man he insulted, and further endangering me?
My point isn’t to pick apart your arguments just for the sake of doing so. Rather, it’s to press home the idea that definition of terms and conditions matter. If you’re going to set out to make an examination of a principle like the Just War Doctrine, you can’t rely on half measures and weak analogies. People often learn from analogies as much or more than they do from the straight talk.
The Greenland issue is settled, but for the sake of argument, let’s assume that it was acquired by force of arms or the under duress due to the threat of force.
Then it’s worth examining Denmark’s claim. How did Norway acquire this land? It acquired it through invasion, beginning in 986. There were “circumpolar peoples” who occupied it prior to first Norse expeditions. Through various machinations Greenland became a colony, and only was only integrated into Denmark in 1953.
So we have sanctimonious pearl clutching from the Archbishop or the author to posit “you can’t steal this from Denmark, they stole it from the original inhabitants fair and square”.
I also note there was no call to defy orders when the miliary was demanding that its members be jabbed.
So you think the use of force to take Greenland from Denmark is acceptable? Anything Trump does is fine? Anything?
Has Dr. Feser served in the military?
Nothing worse than civilians pontificating on war or the military.
Feser is a cogent, careful thinker. If you listen to and watch him let’s say YouTube There Is No Coherent Argument for Atheism you should perceive that. Consequently he would explore the variabilities of a soldier’s ethical response to following orders.
Simply put, there are orders and there are orders and some can be morally unfulfillable. First, as an example anyone who is mentally competent knows we are not obliged to follow orders that are immoral by nature such as executing prisoners. Added to this are controversies.
Feser’s examples actually precipitated controversy among the commenters to his essay. One was defense of others in questionable circumstances: the wrongfully belligerent father being beaten warrants protection from his son. Why? If not that we are indebted to protect our own from injury even if they wrongfully incited the violence. It’s connected to honoring our parents. At least we’re indebted to intervene to prevent further injury. That argument was questioned, what does defense mean?.
The question posed apparently expects an intricate diagram from Feser to spell out all possible responses. Realistically, we’re expected to make common sense decisions with the confidence that we are indeed morally bound to defend the weak. And a person whose being beaten is vulnerable and in danger of serious injury must be assisted with whatever reasonable, non lethal means available to us.
Also, as to wartime conditions that lessen the degree of the thoughtful reaction we can give to conditions, that should be understood as the limitations experienced in combat. Feser’s essay has merit.
Hmmm, if the war is unjust should military chaplains refuse to
be part of it? Does Broglio have the nerve to recall the Catholic chaplains? I doubt it.
In any event, this is all woke chitchat by the academic chattering class. Big Yaawn.
Sean says: “In any event, this is all woke chitchat by the academic chattering class. Big Yaawn.”
Love this comment.
This article only confirms Feser is motivated, to whatever degree, by simple anti-
trump sentiments. To pick the hypothetical scenario of Greenland as an example, which was never meant to be a real possibility, is quite odd, especially with multiple real examples one could use. Does Feser really think Trump was serious and that this would have ever happened?!
At the same time, Feser wants to claim the Iraq war was possibly just, sounding like the neo-con war hawks he also condemns. Is Feser forgetting that JPII was strongly against it? And because it didn’t meet the same criteria Feser uses to criticize the current Iran situation? That is, Iraq hadn’t taken any action against us nor even posed a direct threat to the U.S. And let’s not try to deny that the U.S.’ decision to go in had largely the same motives as our current involvement in Iran- oil, regime change, links to terrorism, Iraq posing a general threat to the region and certain allies. And in Iraq we had a lot of boots on the ground and many americans were killed; while it precisely served as a significant foundation for the second intervention, which indicates not much came from the first one.
The disagreement with JPII would ironically highlight how easy disagreement can be; and thus that Feser should perhaps be more cautious in his pontificating and labeling those who disagree with him as being politically motivated.
This is not to mention that the just war theory needs major updating, as it’s still based largely upon traditional forms of war that are no longer applicable. Basic terms like arms, force, and attack need to be re-defined. For example, other forms of warfare/arms should now include the technological, biological, economic, psychological. Pre-emptive action may also need to be re-considered, due to the possible immediate, instantaneous nature of attack that didn’t previously exist- there’s no longer the “luxury” of watching troops, weapons, ships amass in preparation for an attack or for a country to officially declare war. Waiting until actual attack may be too late, e.g., to wait for a nuclear weapon to be used against you; or waiting for an enemy to make good on immanent threats to cut off a country’s energy or water supply via hacking, or to release a bio-chemical agent into the air.
This is also to say that we can’t simply rely on citing what theologians from hundreds of years ago said, and say “case closed.”