In contemporary debates in Catholic moral theology, a distinction is often drawn between actions that are flatly ruled out in principle and those whose permissibility or impermissibility is a matter of prudential judgment. For example, it is often noted that abortion is wrong always and, in principle, whereas how many immigrants a country ought to allow in and under what conditions are matters of prudential judgment.
But exactly what does this mean, and how do we tell the difference between the cases?
It is important at the outset to put aside some common misunderstandings. The difference between matters of principle and matters of prudential judgment is not a difference between moral questions and merely pragmatic ones. Morality is at issue in both cases. Prudence is, after all, one of the cardinal moral virtues. One can be mistaken in one’s prudential judgments, and when one is, one is guilty of imprudence, which is a kind of moral failure (whether or not one is culpable for the failure).
Contrary to another misunderstanding (which I recently had occasion to rebut), to say that something is a matter of prudential judgment and then go on to note that reasonable people can differ in their prudential judgments is not to commit oneself to any kind of moral relativism. Prudential judgments can indeed simply be mistaken. To say that reasonable people can disagree is merely to note that a person might have made such a judgment in good faith on the basis of the evidence available to him, even if the evidence later turns out to be misleading or his reasoning turns out to have been flawed. He is still objectively wrong all the same. Or there may, in some cases, be more than one reasonable way to apply a certain objective and universal moral principle, so that reasonable people might opt to apply it in any of these different ways.
As always, illumination can be found in St. Thomas Aquinas. In several places, he makes remarks that are relevant to understanding the difference between straightforward matters of principle and matters of prudential judgment. For example, in On Evil, Aquinas notes:
The will of a rational creature is obliged to be subject to God, but this is achieved by affirmative and negative precepts, of which the negative precepts oblige always and on all occasions, and the affirmative precepts oblige always but not on every occasion… One sins mortally who dishonors God by transgressing a negative precept or not fulfilling an affirmative precept on an occasion when it obliges. (Question VI, Regan translation)
Though the distinction between matters of principle and matters of prudence is somewhat loose, it seems largely (though perhaps not always) to correspond to Aquinas’s distinction between negative precepts, which oblige on every occasion, and affirmative precepts, which do not. What this distinction amounts to is made clearer in some remarks St. Thomas makes when commenting on St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans:
He lists the negative precepts, which forbid a person to do evil to his neighbor. And this for two reasons. First, because the negative precepts are more universal both as to time and as to persons. As to time, because the negative precepts oblige always and at every moment. For there is no time when one may steal or commit adultery. Affirmative precepts, on the other hand, oblige always but not at every moment, but at certain times and places: for a man is not obliged to honor his parents every minute of the day, but at certain times and places. Negative precepts are more universal as to persons, because no man may be harmed. Second, because they are more obviously observed by love of neighbor than are the affirmative. For a person who loves another, rather refrains from harming him than gives him benefits, which he is sometimes unable to give. (Commentary on the Letter of Saint Paul to the Romans, Chapter 13, Lecture 2)
Aquinas’s examples hopefully make his meaning clear. Consider the negative precept “Do not commit adultery.” Because adultery is intrinsically evil, we must never commit it, period, regardless of the circumstances. And because we therefore needn’t consider circumstances, no judgment of prudence is required in order to apply the precept to circumstances. Whatever the circumstances happen to be, we simply refrain from committing adultery, and that’s that.
By contrast, applying the affirmative precept “Honor your father and mother” does require attention to circumstances. To be sure, the precept never fails to be binding on us (which is what Aquinas means by saying that it “obliges always”), but exactly what obeying it amounts to depends crucially on circumstances (which is why he says that “times and places” are relevant).
For example, suppose your father commands you to bring him a bottle of wine. Does honoring him oblige you to do so? It depends. Suppose he has had a hard day, finds it relaxing to drink in moderation, and is infirm and has trouble walking. Then it would certainly dishonor your father to ignore him and make him get up and fetch the bottle himself. But suppose instead that he has a serious drinking problem, has already had too much wine, and will likely beat you or your mother if he gets any drunker. Then it would not dishonor him to refuse to bring the bottle.
As Aquinas suggests in the Romans commentary, affirmative precepts involve providing someone with a benefit of some kind, which one is “sometimes unable to give.” Consider the affirmative precept to give alms. Even more obviously than in the case of the precept to honor one’s parents, what following this precept entails concretely is highly dependent on circumstances. Obviously, one cannot always be giving alms, for even if one tried to do so, one would quickly run out of money and not only be unable to give any further alms, but would be in need of alms oneself. How to follow this affirmative precept clearly requires making a judgment of prudence. How much money do I need for my own family? How much might I be able to spare for others, and how frequently? Exactly who, among all the people who need alms, should I give to? Should I give by donating money, or instead by giving food and the like? The answers to these questions are highly dependent on circumstances and will vary from person to person, place to place, and time to time.
The more complicated and variable the circumstances, the more difficult it can be to decide on a single correct answer, and thus the greater the scope for reasonable disagreement. The disagreement can be reasonable in either of two ways.
First, what might be obligatory for one person, given the details of his circumstances, may not be obligatory for another person, given the details of his own very different circumstances. For example, a rich man is bound to be obligated to give more in the way of alms than a poor man is. Second, disagreement can be reasonable insofar as the complexity of the situation might make it uncertain which course of action is best, even for people in the same personal circumstances. Aquinas makes such points in the Summa Theologiae:
The practical reason… is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned: and consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly then… in matters of action, truth or practical rectitude is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rectitude in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.
It is therefore evident that… as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rectitude the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason: and from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases: but it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one’s country. And this principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail, e.g. if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way; because the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore. (Summa Theologiae I-II.94.4)
Points like these are ignored when, for example, it is alleged that Catholics who favor enforcing immigration laws are somehow no less at odds with the Church’s teaching than Catholics who favor legalized abortion. For one thing, as I’ve shown elsewhere, the Church herself acknowledges the legitimacy of restrictions on immigration. For another, the principles involved in the two cases are crucially different in exactly the ways Aquinas describes. “Do not murder” is a negative precept that flatly rules out a certain kind of action, regardless of the circumstances. And since abortion is a kind of murder, it flatly rules out abortion regardless of the circumstances. There is no question of prudential judgment here.
By contrast, “Welcome the stranger” is an affirmative precept, whose application is highly dependent on circumstances. Moreover, these circumstances involve millions of people and complex matters of culture, law, economics, and national security. Here, even more than in the case of almsgiving, there is much room for reasonable disagreement about how best to apply the precept. That would be obvious even if the Church had not explicitly acknowledged that immigration can be restricted for various reasons (as, again, in fact she has).
It is thus sheer sophistry to pretend that by appealing to the notion of prudential judgment, Catholics who support immigration restrictions are somehow trying to rationalize dissent from Catholic teaching. On the contrary, they are (whether one agrees with them or not) fully within the bounds of what Catholic moral theology has always acknowledged to be a legitimate range of opinion among Catholics.
Similar sophistry is committed by those who speak as if supporting a living wage or government provision of health care ought to be no less a matter of “pro-life” concern than abortion and euthanasia. Here, too, the comparison is specious. Abortion and euthanasia are flatly prohibited in all circumstances because they violate the negative precept “Do not murder.” But principles like “Pay a living wage” or “Ensure health care for all” are affirmative precepts, and how best to apply them to concrete circumstances is highly dependent on various complex and contingent economic considerations.
There can be no reasonable disagreement among Catholics about whether abortion and euthanasia should be illegal. But there can be reasonable disagreement among them about whether a certain specific minimum wage law is a good idea, or which sort of economic arrangements provide the best way to secure health coverage for all.
The same point can be made about other contemporary controversies, mutatis mutandis. And it applies across the political spectrum (e.g., to those who, during the most recent presidential election, pretended that there could be no reasonable doubt that any loyal Catholic must vote for their favored candidate).
(Editor’s note: This essay was first posted, in slightly different form, on the author’s blog on July 10th. It is posted here with the kind permission of the author.)
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This an excellent piece. Try to get a bishop or one of his spokesmen to acknowledge the difference between matters related to intrinsic goods and evils and those involving prudential judgement when it comes to their frequent political pronouncements. The best you can usually get from them is that certain issues (e.g. abortion and marriage) are more important than others (e.g. healthcare and immigration). However true that might be, it is not the equivalent of declaring that there is plenty of room for disagreement in the latter category. They deliberately blur the line because of they wish to convey the impression that their ideological advocacy is binding church teaching. It is also an outrageous abuse authority.
Tony: “they deliberately blur…..,because they wish to convey the impression” – retrocognition?
I would reasonably doubt that most modern priests would understand nor appreciate your comments, much less those of Dr Feser and certainly not that of St Thomas. Our homilies and prayers of the people in our parish are progressive and presented as Gospel, objectively true to the point that any contrarian view is obviously sinful.
Maybe the clergy should only pronounce on things that are black and white, and avoid the grey areas. Maybe if they did that, we’d have fewer Catholics fornicating, using contraception, and getting divorced.
Meshes: better yet -pronounce on one while teaching on other.
In the Catholic history what was once said to be a prudential judgment on slavery, namely slaery was not an intrinsical evil always to be rejected as an abnsolute negative imperative but rather subject to pudential judgements such as human treatement of slaves and avoding breaking up of enslaved families was apparently the Church’s official stance. Indeed, when the Vatican gave permission to Georgetown Univeersity to sell it’s slaves, these where among the conditions required, including the provision that if at all possible slavwes to shold to Catholic masters so that slaves would remain or become Catholic. One would have to woarder if the day will come when abortion and physician assisted dying are no longer defined as murder that can neveer be justified, can never be a matter of prudential judgments. For some Catholics that day has already come.
Excellent post on “ matters related to intrinsic goods and evils and those involving prudential judgement”.
If negative precepts ‘oblige always and at every moment’, wouldn’t that also be true of the negative precept not to kill? How would support for the death penalty and just war theory be reconciled to this?
Most of this is over my head but I’m pretty sure Catholic teaching upholds self defense.
I’m no fan of wars or the death penalty but there can be rare occasions when there’s no other option to protect society.
ask Sergeant York (although he wasn’t Catholic)
Thank you knowall. That was a great movie. So was Hacksaw Ridge.
The Hebrew word is actually “murder”, not “kill”. Given the variety of offenses that the Torah prescribed the death penalty for, it is reasonable to assume that capital punishment was not considered murder.
I’ve heard that in the Old Testament that the death penalty was more prescriptive, to indicate the seriousness of the offence. That it was difficult to carry out the death penalty in practice.
Capital punishment is justice legislated, sanctioned, and administered by a state or a nation for the purpose of protecting the larger society. It also acts to deter others who may be considering heinous crimes against civil society.
Murder involves one person ending the life of another person.
The actual precept is though shall not murder (or take the life of the innocent), which is always wrong in every instance. Taking of life to protect life or as just punishment is a different animal
We read: “Though the distinction between matters of principle and matters of prudence is somewhat loose, it seems largely (though perhaps not always) to correspond to Aquinas’s distinction between negative precepts, which oblige on every occasion, and affirmative precepts, which do not.”
Some points and a question:
ST. JOHN PAUL II says it this way: “…the commandment of love of God and neighbor does not have in its dynamic any higher limit, BUT [Caps added] it does have a lower limit, beneath which the commandment is broken” (Veritatis Splendor, 1993, n. 52).
And, about capital punishment and the actual use (not immorality!) of the death penalty, the Church has judged that “such cases are very rare, if not practically non-existent” (“The Gospel of Life,” 1995, n. 56), and even “inadmissible” (Pope Francis, later revised CCC 2267, August 2, 2018). When asked for clarification about “The Gospel of Life,” Cardinals Ratzinger and Avery Dulles reaffirmed unbroken continuity with past teachings about morality—and the legitimacy of retributive justice and defense of the public order (not simply rehabilitation).
RATZINGER responded: “Clearly the Holy Father has not altered the doctrinal principles…but has simply deepened (their) application…in the context of present-day historical circumstances” (National Review, July 10, 1995; First Things, Oct. 1995). In Ratzinger’s July 2004 letter to DC’s former-Cardinal McCarrick—a letter intended for all of the bishops but which came to light only when later leaked to the press—he wrote: “Not all moral issues have the same moral weight as abortion and euthanasia….There may be a legitimate diversity of opinion even among Catholics about waging war and applying the death penalty, but not however with regard to abortion and euthanasia.”
Cardinal AVERY DULLES concluded that traditional teachings on “retributive justice” and “vindication of the moral order” are not reversed by John Paul II’s strong “prudential judgment” regarding the use (!) of capital punishment. The pope simply remained silent on these teachings. (“Seven Reasons America Shouldn’t Execute”, National Catholic Register, 3-24-02).
QUESTION: Does the term “inadmissible”—still a prudential judgment not actually reversing past teachings (?)—also sound a lot like the mutant Fiducia Supplicans with its fluid admissibility for “informal,” “non-liturgical” and “spontaneous” blessing of “irregular couples”—as couples? Fluid, as in crossing the Rubicon!
About the distinction between moral absolutes and prudential judgments…square circles, anyone?
One must also remember that prudence is required when conducting a root cause analysis given the two types…the first being the subjective analysis the has sufficient depth to reach an a priori result while the second analysis digs deeper to the actual root cause. Finally how one defines the issue determines how one resolve the issue. Poorly defining the issue precludes resolution of the issue.
“Sophistry is committed if supporting a living wage [is] no less a matter of pro-life concern than abortion”, precis of Feser’s example. A good example of the common moral error widely used in politics. The strength of the alleged sophist argument is when there is evidence that low wages, say in a rural area can reasonably be shown in marked health issues and morbidity.
As to the inviolable negative precept, “For there is no time when one may steal” is treated by Aquinas more extensively by Alphonsus Ligouri, the common example a famished person ‘secretly’ taking from an orchard. Another, a hunter confiscating a fisherman’s moored boat to cross a river and protect children from an aggressive bear.
Feser’s essay offers good principles for exercising the virtue prudence in decision making. As Aquinas firmly taught we’re required to deliberate on the conditions of a moral act rather than impose a universal, to wit the universal must meet the conditions.
No one has mentioned the use of VENN diagrams to help make these difficult decisions.
Will someone please explain the proper use of VENN diagrams in cases of Jurisprudence?
Might we say that a VENN diagram is irrelevant to “moral judgments.” The natural law tells us what NOT to do.
The VENN diagram might relate to the various “decisions” for carrying out, for example, the possibly overlapping (or not) options under the Sermon on the Mount. This from my comment above (6:29 a.m.):
ST. JOHN PAUL II says it this way: “…the commandment of love of God and neighbor does not have in its dynamic any higher limit, BUT [Caps added] it does have a lower limit, beneath which the commandment is broken” (Veritatis Splendor, 1993, n. 52).
“Because adultery is intrinsically evil, we must never commit it, period, regardless of the circumstances. And because we therefore needn’t consider circumstances, no judgment of prudence is required in order to *apply* the precept to circumstances.”
Except, there are cases where it is necessary to look at the circumstances in order to decide what the genus of an act actually is. (E.g. the difference between stealing because of personal greed, and “stealing” to feed someone on the point of starvation.) Prudence always requires us to look carefully at circumstances. (Especially important wherever double effect may come into play — which is in rather a lot of cases.)
“Abortion and euthanasia are flatly prohibited in all circumstances”
However, legislation allowing abortion and euthanasia is not flatly prohibited; it depends on circumstances.
“By contrast, “Welcome the stranger” is an affirmative precept,”
Except the Church more specifically teaches: “The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search of the security and the means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin.”
It would be legitimate for someone to claim that this precept is being violated, by examining circumstances and seeing whether or not the condition “to the extent they are able” has actually even been discussed and evaluated.
And it’s necessary not to simply point out that something is in principle a prudential judgement, but also to present an actual prudential judgement.
“The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search of the security and the means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin.”
I know this is from the Catechism, but it also is a rather general and somewhat vague principle, highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of a given country at a particular time in its history for its applicability. I dare say, that, overall, it’s a debatable proposition.
“The more prosperous nations are obliged, to the extent they are able, to welcome the foreigner in search of the security and the means of livelihood which he cannot find in his country of origin.”
“I know this is from the Catechism, but it also is a rather general and somewhat vague principle, highly dependent on the facts and circumstances of a given country at a particular time in its history for its applicability. I dare say, that, overall, it’s a debatable proposition.”
#2241 of the Catechism derives from Lev 19:33-34, Deut 10:18-19, Mat 25:34-36,40, and the documents Pacem in Terris, Laborem Exercens, and Gaudium et Spes.
While deciding on exactly how to fulfill the obligation may be a matter of prudence, the avoidance of any discussion of this (as is typical of many different US administrations) clearly does not fulfill the obligation, and the deficiency of Catholic pushing on this issue also does not fulfill the obligation.
Too often the people pushing the immigration issue are using other people’s tax money, and often dumping the immigrants into communities without their say so as to their ability to handle the inflow. Practicing conscription to achieve their aims. A serious lack of courtesy. Most public places like auditoriums and the like have posted capacity limits in the interest of public safety. Open borders flaunts this practice and will flood the country with immigrants. Open uncontrolled borders is pretty much a case of a manufactured crisis. An invitation to chaos, and social disruption.
CCC 2241.2 is often ignored, even disappeared, on USCCB’s various websites. It describes the responsibilities of the immigrant:
“Immigrants are obliged to respect with gratitude the material and spiritual heritage of the country that receives them, to obey its laws and to assist in carrying civic burdens.
It is clear that every immigrant who enters *any* country illegally has refused to exercise this duty. Nations not only may, but *must* take this fact into account.
In the US, bishops refuse to – sadly, they’re unanimous.
Why? I finally decided to write a book answering that question. You can find it at cforc.com/charityforsale.
“Immigrants are obliged to respect with gratitude the material and spiritual heritage of the country that receives them, to obey its laws and to assist in carrying civic burdens. It is clear that every immigrant who enters *any* country illegally has refused to exercise this duty.”
No, it’s not clear. If you look at the very next numbered paragraph, #2242, it is clear that some laws don’t apply when they are “to the demands of the moral order, to the fundamental rights of persons or the teachings of the Gospel”. And, as #1902 affirms, unjust laws are not binding in conscience, but act as a kind of violence.
It is certainly true that a judgment call has to be made as to when a prosperous country has failed to welcome the foreigner to the extent they are able (or other obligations that they have). But if it has failed to do that, there is no moral obligation to obey its unjust laws.
It’s my impression that at least some bishops don’t think that all the relevant laws are just, and to be strictly obeyed.
You describe the decline that us old folks have experienced during and since the 1960’s.
What was once magisterial truth first became ignored (Humanae Vitae after July 1968), and then pronounced false (homosexual blessings, or Father Martin SJ’s celebration of homosexual clergy in general).
Meanwhile, thanks to the perversion of “Social Justice,” a once-valid term, what was once prudential became magisterial.
In this sense, “prudential” describes opinions on which good Catholics can disagree and still receive the Eucharist.
Leftists charge that their critics just want bishops to embrace *non*-leftist prudential views views instead of their current secular progressive agenda.
No thank you. We want our shepherds to return to the teaching that they have abandoned – the magisterial truths of the faith on family, sex, marriage, the Sacraments, and true, voluntary charity (the only kind, frankly).
Leave politics to the laity (Lumen Gentium and all that).
Catechisms, encyclicals, etc. are filled with all manner of fallible prudential judgements especially when our popes and bishops delve into areas where they have no special competence to speak authoritatively. The language on immigration in the catechism is rather imprecise and certainly open to interpretation (which is probably a good thing). At any rate, it is not immoral for a nation (such as the USA) to have a restrictive immigration policy, whatever popes and bishops may think about it. They are free to express their own opinions on the issue, but the laity have the right to respectfully disagree and do otherwise.