The term “hermeneutic”, like “consubstantial” and “immaculate”, proves that Catholics are good with polysyllabic words. A “hermeneutic” is a principle of interpretation or approach to understanding. “Hermeneutic” became common in Church circles during Benedict XVI’s papacy, when the Pope distinguished between the hermeneutic of “reform” (and “renewal in the continuity”) and the hermeneutic of “discontinuity and rupture” to discuss how to understand doctrinal development and how Vatican II fit with what preceded it.
I want to suggest the Church might need an additional hermeneutic: the “hermeneutic of suspicion”.
The Vatican has recently gone into overdrive in addressing cases of priests involved in or “credibly accused” of sexual abuse. Its latest tactic (which some of us think dilatory) is acting as if, absent final and proven adjudication of an abuse finding, openly discussing such charges represents an injustice of detraction or calumny. One wonders, for example, about its possible impact on the slow-tracking of the Marko Rupnik case.
Pope Francis himself has used this tactic for years. When Chilean abuse victims attacked his appointment of Bishop Juan Barros–at least credibly involved with a central figure in Chile’s sex abuse scandals–Francis’s first reaction was to call the protests “slander”. When evidence backed the protestors, Francis subsequently apologized and Barros disappeared. But, throughout his pontificate, Francis’s constant preaching about “gossip” (would that he focused as much on sexual ethics!) suggests it is the one chapter in moral theology not subject to “doctrinal evolution” in this papacy.
I think, however, that the Church might learn something from the “hermeneutic of suspicion,” which starts from the premise that things aren’t always as they claim to be. As literary theorist Rita Felski puts it, the hermeneutic of suspicion “circumvents obvious or self-evident meanings in order to draw out less visible and less flattering truths…” In other words, by questioning the truth of what’s claimed, the hermeneutic of suspicion asks whether such “explanations” actually protect those whose interests or power benefit from maintaining the status quo.
The “hermeneutic of suspicion” is operative, in some sense, in the American checks and balances system. Suspicious that sinful men will be prone to abuse power, the Constitution institutionalizes ways of diluting power so that damage can be limited even if one surrenders to his “less flattering” impulses.
Something of the “hermeneutic of suspicion” can also be found in the Supreme Court decision New York Times v. Sullivan, a 1964 case involving libel law. In that case, an Alabama Commissioner of Public Affairs sued the paper over an advertisement collecting money for a legal defense fund for Martin Luther King. The ad contained some factual inaccuracies about the Commissioner, who demanded its retraction. When the paper refused, he sued and got a conviction under Alabama’s libel law.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court threw out the conviction, introducing into libel law a distinction between ordinary folk and “public officials.” For a successful libel action against the latter, one must not only prove statements about them were false but that the publisher knew them to be false yet still acted in “actual malice” by publishing them.
The Court’s logic was that the power available to public officials to use against their critics and to hide potential wrongdoing was greater than the average person’s ability to compete with and expose it. Healthy democratic discourse demands the right of people to voice their suspicions about those in power, even if they cannot immediately prove them. Obviously, a healthy free press should also want to investigate those suspicions objectively and thereby hold public officials and accusers accountable.
I know there are critics of Sullivan who say that it is judge-made law, that previous libel law sufficed, and that it opened up public officials to all manner of character assassination. Perhaps that is true. But maybe it’s the only way to better balance the power in play between the governed and those governing.
Why do I raise these questions?
Because both the notion of “hermeneutic of suspicion” and the logic behind New York Times v. Sullivan may illumine a side of the “good name” question to which the Church’s current tack seems oblivious. Those with power, in the Church or state, do not always lay all their cards out in the open.
So, is Rome suggesting that the proper Catholic response to a claim about sexual abuse should be to deny it until proven otherwise, never to give credence to its veracity or to consider who might benefit from its denial? That seems incredibly credulous, a naivete of which the Church’s two millennia of human experience should disabuse it.
Take the Vatican’s 2020 report about how Theodore McCarrick got to where he did ecclesiastically. It reeks of denial of the “hermeneutic of suspicion” in favor of a credulity that appears to be the result of protecting the “good name” of the ex-Cardinal at all costs. Are we to believe an allegation that a Catholic bishop bedding adult seminarians was not so “out of the ordinary” in the mid-1980s that it did not set off warning bells? Should not Rome have thought it fitting proactively to examine not just whether the claim was “credible” but to insist for the good of the Church that the allegation be affirmatively disproven?
Yes, an accused cleric has a right to his good name. But that cleric is not the only party with interests here. The Church has a right to moral integrity in her hierarchical leadership. And no one has a right to an ecclesiastical appointment.
We all know that the erosion of hierarchical moral integrity has compromised the Church’s moral leadership. A cursory reading of “the signs of the times” should make Rome aware that its moral voice–a voice desperately needed today–has lost a hearing because sex scandals compromise the Church’s credibility. That loss is also an “injustice” with which the Church seems not to reckon.
Perhaps a healthy dose of “the hermeneutic of suspicion”–of proper and robust skepticism–would be a worthwhile corrective to Rome’s seeming self-paralysis about cleaning out its sexual Augean stables. And Sullivan reminds us that those in office have at their disposal uneven power vis-à-vis their critics or opponents. The McCarrick affair exposed the “power imbalance” involving seminarians whose track to ordination is entirely dependent on a bishop. Fr. Boniface Ramsey, who helped blow that scandal wide open, put himself clearly at risk as an ordinary priest reporting on an up-and-coming cardinal-wannabe. Given those facts, the failure to apply a “hermeneutic of suspicion” seems, most charitably, naïve.
With Rome so often acting as if smoke doesn’t necessarily indicate fire until the Pope gets burned (as in the Barros case), a healthier dose of a “hermeneutic of suspicion” could have helped to avoid that.
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Hermeneutic of suspicion has wide latitude as well as longitude. Per esempio take Grondelski’s mention of the Vat 2020 McCarrick report, which on the surface seems a whitewash related [longitudinally] to level ground clergy, whereas we naturally by a form of Synderesis suspiciously look [latitudinally] upward . Therein appears the rationale for producing the report.
We cannot leave Archbishop Viganò out of the scenario simply because of the breadth of the explosion of his charges against His Holiness. But then as Grondelski shows there’s a series of like scenarios that lead to the contemporary ongoing Rupnik charade. When we’re dealing with a Church in moral disarray we’re justified in harboring thoughts of possible moral disorder.
The argument by some is that the doctrine of ecclesial indefectibility would have us be less concerned since none of it however significant by appearance in the end will amount to nothing. That divine providence will prevent any such dire consequence to occur. That position held by well intended persons is in fact detrimental.
One thing I learned from my Jesuit teachers is the maxim of acting as if everything depended on you and believing it all depends on God. So, I am not a friend of the passive types that console themselves with ecclesiastical indefectibility and some kind of Julian of Norwich Polyanna “all will be well.” It’ll all be well at the General Judgment: I just want to know what side I’m on. And that requires some action.
Amen brother John,
You say: “Francis’ constant preaching about “gossip” (would that he focused as much on sexual ethics!) suggests it is the one chapter in moral theology not subject to “doctrinal evolution” in this papacy.”
Would that the head of this papacy notice the imperatives of virtue at all, or innate truth. From the flippant comments of a barstool philosopher at 30,000 feet, to demanding sham séance synods waiting for “new truth” to supersede received truth to prove greater insights than that witnessed by the Church’s most saintly minds, effectively making God a liar, Francis has unraveled enough preconceptions of moral witness to make any basis of inspiring universally recognized moral outrage as unlikely as the profundity of a sporting event. And the world suffers greater tragedies because the entire Church has become wimps, excepting a few, and refuses to explain this to him.
Great maxim.
Yep. It is a very stupid patient that refuses to take his medicine based on the assurance that if he does not, he will not die, but merely continue to be quite sick, and suffer until he does take it. Most of us prefer to be cured.
The big problem with this is that the standard of proving that something did not happen can be almost impossible to fulfill. For example, I don’t get a receipt from every gasoline station that I pass on the road saying that I didn’t purchase gasoline there that day. (I have all I can do to get a receipt from the pumps where I do buy gasoline.) I do agree that trust in the institutions of our Church may well be at an all-time low– and justifiably so– but we can’t go to the other extreme either and rely solely on the testimony of an accuser, which unfortunately in the absence of witnesses may be all we have in any particular case and indeed in general. Ironically, we need look only at Cardinal Pell, who might have done quite a lot more to change this situation had he not been unjustly imprisoned, to see the result of going too far the other way.
What I will say in Dr. Grondelski’s defense is that while we may not go as far as to remove every accused priest or bishop from ministry immediately and permanently, neither are we obligated to promote priests who are walking around with a cloud of smoke around them, which appears to be what happened with Theodore McCarrick. The adage, “where there’s smoke, there’s fire,” is not entirely unjustified. “No one has a right to an ecclesiastical appointment” is quite true.
About a “hermeneutic of suspicion” in some matters, we also have in biblical interpretation the limits of the historical-critical method–and in Benedict XVI’s writings both an acknowledgement of the value of the method, and a caution that we now might label a “suspicion of hermeneutics.”
There is a cold self-centered logic to the desire to maintain “a good name.” For instance, if you investigate a clerical abuse case, collect and verify evidence, but never bring the case to trial, the cleric can enjoy the presumption of innocence and maintain a “good name” indefinitely. Not because there’s no credible evidence, but because without a trial, there’s no chance of being convicted. That is essentially what happened when the Jesuits expelled Marko Rupnik from the Society after he didn’t cooperate with their investigation or with the restrictions they placed on him. They simply disavowed responsibility for him, then he was free to do whatever. The Society was also protected from further association with Rupnic. For Rupnic and the Jesuits, it was a win-win situation, but at the expense of the victims and of the Body of Christ as a whole.
I agree, Mary, the Jesuits did what the Jesuits do best – weasel their way out of responsibility. After all, Jesuits are above it all. They are the ecclesiastical elite. They are always the smartest one in the room. Jesuits protect themselves first at all costs. And now the Jesuits are in charge, awash in money, and above the law. They wash their hands of one of their problems and just get to walk away.
A very insightful conclusion Mary E.
Thank you.
>> There is a cold self-centered logic to the desire to maintain “a good name.”
“Cold self-centered” is a very good descriptive word for the logic of a malignant narcissist, whose typical modus operandi I believe can clarify much of what is happening in the Church.
Supposedly such a person is a head of a family, a parent or a grandparent. Such a person cares about appearances only and is focused on projecting a perfect image of his family (which he perceives to be an extension of himself) onto the world. Typically, such a family is bent on covering up the abuse within it, for the purpose of maintaining a respectable façade, so the outsiders would not lose an admiration/respect for it, without which a narcissist cannot live. It is also important, for a narcissist, to feel that he is always right. He achieves this by assigning different roles to the family members.
The abuse typically happens to so-called “scapegoat children” while a few others are given a status of “golden children”. “Scapegoats” are perceived as “inherently bad” (a narcissist projects his own bad qualities onto them) and are abused by parents and “golden siblings” while the latter are “always good” = privileged. “Golden children” are an extension of the “goodness” of a narcissist, of a narcissist himself. “Golden children” help a narcissistic parent to preserve his grand image for the world, covering him up. Likewise, a narcissistic parent covers up the abuse of his “golden children”. As soon as “a scapegoat” speaks about the abuse to the world, he is slandered and ostracized. If the abuse done by “a golden child” cannot be covered up he is spat out as well – but if it is possible to cover it up, he will retain his status no matter how gross his crime is. There are no morals there; all is measured by “how much the misdeed threatens an image of the head”.
Now let us apply this sickening but very familiar, in the field of psychology, scheme to the current situation in the Church. The toxic parents are the top clergy; “golden boys” are the clergy below them, as long as they are faithful to them; scapegoats are the laity (or those rare priests who defend the abused) who had a misfortune of being abused by “the golden boys” or by the top clergy. Just like a narcissist who always defends his “golden children” and spits on victims, a narcissistic archbishop (for example) always defends his raping “golden boys”. The victims, the laity, are ostracized and pictured as “bad”, “ungrateful” and so on. Like “scapegoats” in the family they never get empathy and help but are driven to suicide. But, as soon as a narcissist archbishop or whoever perceives that “a golden boy” is not defensible, he will discard him because he threatens his image – not because his crime is bad enough.
All this is done for a protection of the IMAGE of the Church (not for the Church, the Body of Christ) which is nothing more but the self-image of narcissistic clergy. Just like a lay narcissistic parent thinks “my family is I, I am the family”, narcissistic clergy thinks “Church is I, I am the Church (and whoever is my extension)”.
Note the absence of Christ in all that. Only via not seeing Christ, not loving Christ narcissistic clergy can go on. A narcissist cannot endure Christ Who is his judgement, the judgement of his emptiness. This is why in my experience (for more than ten years) narcissist priests are unable even to speak of Christ as the real, living Person.
And here appears a very sickening phenomenon. “The Church is I”, “the Church is my body” is what the antichrist thinks. A collective antichrist. This is why I am convinced that what is going on now in the Church is an action of a collective antichrist = of people who are infected by narcissism. It is slowly overtaking the Body of Christ. It will not overtake it all but to witness the process is truly unbearable.
I think the proper disposition is not one of suspicion, nor of trust (which is what the Pontiff Francis once suggested, during his typical high-handed behavior in the Barros affair) but one of truth and justice.
That, of course, presents “hurdles” for the existing leadership in the McCarrick Establishment.
The first problem is that the USCCB standard of a “credible” accusation is ludicrous. Secondly, the accused cleric has no resources at his disposal to defend himself (a bishop uses diocesan attorneys and money)! Thirdly, once an accusation has been publicized, there is almost no possibility for an exonerated cleric ever to have a public ministry since so many laity (who expect unlimited mercy for their own real sins) are woefully unforgiving and even adamantly hard-hearted in regard to priests.
All of this helps explain why many parents who, years ago prayed for one of their sons to become a priest, now discourage their boys from such a consideration.
And after the priest is accused, he’s expected to vacate the rectory immediately and go find some place else to live on his own dime without a job and quite likely no savings, so how is he supposed to hire a canon lawyer besides? If there’s a lawsuit, too many bishops just want to settle out of court as quickly as possible regardless of the cost– and they just want the accused priest to “go away.” A system where the innocent are punished and the guilty go free is extremely frustrating to endure– and changing things so that more innocent are punished while more guilty go free is not what we need.
“And if anyone hurts the conscience of one of these little ones, believe me, he had better have been drowned in the depths of the sea, with a millstone hung about his neck. Woe to the world, for the hurt done to consciences! It must needs be that such hurt should come, but woe to the man through whom it comes!”
Matthew 18 6-8, Knox.
This is also a problem — my good friend Fr Tom Guarino constantly talks about this (see 3/18 First Things). That said, we need to find a standard that works between “guilty till proven innocent” versus the Three Monkeys Defense (“I see nothing. I hear nothing. I know nothing”).
Isn’t a hermeneutic of suspicion the weapon of choice of thinkers such as Derrida, The Frankfurt School, et al.?
It is, which is why I have mulled this piece for four years. I wrote it first when the Vatican issued its Uncle Teddy report in 2020, when it combined the lack of a hermeneutic of suspicion with its best Sargent Schultz imitation: “I know nothing! NOOOTTTHING!!!” But like the ancients, I still think there is a two-way learning street between Athens and Jerusalem, even if it might have a Frankfurt stopover.
Our priests ought to unionize.
Due diligence is a term that I like. It incorporates the idea of suspicion, but it is a suspicion joined to a well-known process that either confirms or refutes the suspicion. Unfortunately, Church leadership seems uninterested in due diligence. This seems ever more so the case with our current Pontiff, friend of Rupnik, who has personally benefited from the fact that due diligence was largely absent during his own ascent through the ranks of the Church—I recall the prophecy of Fr Kolvenbach, Bergoglio’s superior general in the 1990s, who warned the Vatican of Bergoglio’s unstable personality.
Like the “due diligence” criterion. Demand proof, but then disprove, too.
Want evidence of the latest twist on how the “good name” tactic is impeding honest investigation? The 3/19 Pillar reports that a Vatican appeals court has refused to accept the appeal of Libero Milone, the auditor Francis hired, then fired, for wrongful termination. The court demands that his appeal strip out everything in the brief that argues “…including evidence of alleged financial misconduct that could harm the “good name” of high-ranking Vatican officials.” It calls those charges generalized, “immoral and indecent.” Well, if you a priori decide you won’t listen to arguments because it might tarnish the stellar reputations of curial clerics, one might seem to have a basis to entertain doubts about the veracity of Vatican “justice” (but I guess maybe I am also impugning somebody’s “good name”). https://www.pillarcatholic.com/p/vatican-court-auditor-cannot-bring