Court rules that Indiana HS teacher entitled to a trial over his religious belief

As reflected in a recent case from Indiana, “the wheels of justice grind slow[ly] but exceedingly fine[ly].” On August 5, 2025, a divided Seventh Circuit, on its third try, finally ruled in favor of a Christian high school music-orchestra teacher in a dispute that I wrote about in 2024 for Catholic Word Report, Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation.

The teacher, John Kluge, had resigned rather than be fired for refusing to comply with his board’s policy and violate his religious beliefs by calling students identifying as “transgender” by their “preferred” pronouns and names rather than those corresponding to their birth sexes.

This column first reviews Kluge’s facts and judicial history before reflecting on its significance for religious freedom.

Kluge v. Brownsburg Community School Corporation

Controversy arose in early fall 2017 when Kluge, a music-orchestra teacher, attempted to compromise with a student who was “transitioning” rather than violate his religious beliefs about transgenderism.

The board initially approved Kluge’s requested accommodation of referring to all students “by only their last names—‘like a sports coach.’” Soon, though, officials rescinded the accommodation “because a handful of students and teachers, as well as one student’s parents,” complained. After four years of successful teaching, Kluge resigned rather than be fired. Kluge then unsuccessfully filed suit in 2020 under the far-reaching Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination based on religion and other characteristics.

After a federal trial court twice issued judgments supporting the board, the Seventh Circuit initially affirmed in its favor. On a rehearing, in an unreported opinion, the court vacated and remanded in light of the Supreme Court’s 2024 ruling in Groff v. DeJoy. Groff required the Postal Service and other employers to make reasonable religious accommodations for their employees, here granting the plaintiff time off for worship on Sundays, not causing them undue hardships.

On remand, the trial judge argued that the teacher’s requested accommodation of using students’ last names created an undue hardship, outweighing his rights. The judge also thought questions of fact existed about the sincerity of Kluge’s beliefs.

On further review, a split Seventh Circuit, in a two-to-one order, reversed in favor of Kluge finding that he was entitled to a trial on the merits of his Title VII claim regarding whether his requested accommodation created an undue hardship. In its analysis, the court noted that Kluge “was regarded as an exceptional music teacher by many of his current and former students.”

Moreover, casting doubt on the trial court judge’s lack of clarity on this issue, the panel observed that Kluge “is also a Christian, actively involved in his church’s leadership.”

The court reasoned that, objectively viewing “the evidence in the light most favorable to Kluge, the school introduced nothing to show that a teacher using one’s last name resulted in ‘emotional distress’ under an objective standard.” The court explained that in refusing to accommodate Kluge’s beliefs, “there is insufficient evidence to conclude that calling students by their last names, without more, would inflict emotional harm on a reasonable person…or that it disrupted the learning environment.”

Consequently, the board faces liability for damages, including lost pay and attorney fees.

A strident dissent, which was longer than the court’s opinion, argued that officials did all they could to accommodate Kluge, stopping only after his actions resulted in undescribed harms that were supposedly disruptive to the school environment. The judge also feared that the court rendered jurors a “super-personnel department [to] second-guess the [board’s] good-faith” decisions, ignoring that their role is to be triers of fact as to exactly what happened.

Reflections and analysis

The Seventh Circuit’s judgment in Kluge joins the majority of courts in litigation arising in K-12 schools in Virginis and Ohio, (who received substantial financial settlements from their boards), as well as in higher education upholding the religious freedom rights of educators not to have to refer to students using their “preferred” pronouns or names inconsistent with their birth sexes in violation of their faith-based beliefs. In yet another clear conflict over values, the courts are placed in the position of being arbiters over whose values will prevail.

As this legal fight rages on, I note again that all people are entitled to respect regardless of their life choices. However, what is apparently missed or ignored as ideological advocates, including activists in the guise of educators who promote their views without regard for the rights of others, brooking no dissent, is that basic respect is supposed to go both ways. The need for mutual respect is especially important in light of Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that people of faith cannot be compelled to communicate views inconsistent with their beliefs, whether attempting to force a baker to prepare a marriage cake for a “same-sex couple” or a wedding website designer to offer her services for another “same-sex couple”.

As much as people of faith and others must respect and admire Kluge for his heroic stance in the face of being treated unfairly in being put through a proverbial wringer due to his religious beliefs, it is important to note that the Seventh Circuit pointed out that many of his present and former students respected him as an exceptional educator. Moving forward, hopefully, the trial court judge will take a step back in examining the facts objectively and respect Kluge’s assertion that he refused to violate his sincerely held religious beliefs using pronouns and names inconsistent with his faith.

On remand, it remains to be seen whether the case will actually make it to trial because Kluge and the school board will have the option of reaching a settlement agreement, sparing both sides the time and expense of litigation. However, it appears, at this point, that the board officials have “dug their heels in” on this issue, and so a settlement does not appear to be likely or feasible.

Hopefully, should the trial court ultimately review this dispute on its merits, the judge will no longer allow her apparent ideological bias to interfere with a just outcome. In so doing, the judge should respect and defer to the Seventh Circuit’s recognition that Kluge’s unwillingness to use pronouns or names inconsistent with his faith was not a question of fact. Rather, Kluge’s reticence was, indeed, based on his sincere religious belief rather than antipathy to the individuals involved in light of the higher court’s acknowledgement of his leadership activity in his church.

Moreover, absent clear indications or proof of emotional harm or disruptions that did not seem present when viewed through the lens of a “reasonable person,” the judge should correct this grave injustice. By ruling in his favor, the judge can affirm and uphold Kluge’s rights, and by extension those of all educators, to practice their religious beliefs freely in the workplace.